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We construct a dynamic equilibrium model where there is costly search in the goods market
and the labor market. Incorporating shocks to money growth and productivity, we calibrate
the model to the US time series data to examine the model’s quantitative predictions on
aggregate variables and, in particular, on the variability of consumption velocity of money.
Despite the fact that money is the only asset, the model captures most of the variability of
velocity in the data. It also generates realistic predictions on the moments of other variables
and provides peresistent propagation of the shocks. The model generates these results largely
because costly search gives an important role to the extensive margin of trade.
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In this paper we construct a stochastic monetary model where there is costly search in both the
goods market and the labor market. After calibrating the model to the US data, we compare the
statistical moments of aggregate variables in the model with the sample moments. In particular,
we focus on the short-run (quarterly) variability of consumption velocity of money.
Figures 1 and 2 here.
Velocity varies considerably in the US data, both in the long run and in the short run. Figure 1
depicts the raw series and the ﬁltered series of consumption velocity of money in the period 1959:I
— 1998:III, using M1 as the monetary aggregate and the expenditure on non-durable goods as
consumption.1 Figure 2 depicts velocity of M2. Three features are noticeable from these ﬁgures.
First, M1 velocity has a growing trend, with a brief interruption in the 1980s. Second, M2
velocity does not seem to have a growing trend, but there was a distinct jump in the 1990s.
Third, both M1v e l o c i t ya n dM2 velocity are volatile, as illustrated by the ﬁltered series. It is
not diﬃcult to explain the ﬁrst two features. At the annual frequency, the trend and large shifts
in velocity can be explained well by changes in interest rates (e.g., Lucas, 1988, and McGrattan,
1998) and by shifts in expectations about government policy (e.g., Gordon et al., 1998). However,
these explanations fail to account for the large variability of velocity at the frequency of business
cycles in the ﬁltered data.
In fact, previous attempts to use general equilibrium models to explain the variability of
velocity have had very limited success. For example, in the simplest model where all consumption
is purchased with cash in advance, velocity is constant at unity. In an attempt to overcome this
diﬃculty, Hodrick et al. (1991) endogenize velocity by introducing credit goods and diﬀerent
information structures. Despite these modiﬁcations, the variability of velocity is less than 40%
of that in the data (Table 6 therein) and the moments of some key variables are unrealistic. This
low variability of velocity remains a feature of general equilibrium models even when the liquidity
1Throughout this paper, the ﬁltering procedure is the ﬁlter used by Hodrick and Prescott (1980).
1eﬀect is introduced to increase the volatility of interest rates (see Christiano, 1991). In this paper,
we investigate whether alternative models can account for the variability of velocity.
There are two motivations for focusing on the velocity of money. One is that understanding
short-run ﬂuctuations of velocity is important for understanding the role of money in business
cycles. According to the monetarists, changes in the money stock are important sources of output
ﬂuctuations. Central to this view is the assumption that velocity can be expressed as a stable
function of a few macro variables, such as interest rates.2 A large variability of velocity at
the business cycle frequency presents a challenge to this assumption, especially when most of it
cannot be explained by variations in the macro variables. Even if one is not interested in the
monetarists’ view, velocity is still a useful indication of how well a model can explain monetary
business cycles. For example, the failure of traditional monetary models in accounting for the
variability of velocity is often accompanied by their weak propagation of monetary shocks. Thus,
ﬁnding an explanation for the large variability of velocity may also provide a useful lead to the
search in the future for a strong monetary propagation mechanism.
The other motivation for our analysis is to investigate the quantitative predictions of search
models. Over the last ﬁfteen years or so, monetary theorists have developed search models from
the rudimentary setup of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989, 1993) into a comprehensive microfoundation
of money. However, most of these contributions have been theoretical. In this paper, we attempt
to show that search models also have interesting quantitative predictions that are diﬀerent from
traditional models. Velocity is a convenient dimension to achieve this purpose. This is so not only
because traditional models have had diﬃculty to generate suﬃcient variability of velocity, but
also because velocity is a more meaningful concept to individual agents in a search model than
in traditional models. In traditional models, velocity is a summary statistic that may not have
any direct inﬂuence on individuals’ decisions. In contrast, velocity in a search model captures the
precise notion of how many times money has been spent in trade. This notion is tightly related
to the frequency of trade which directly inﬂuences agents’ search decisions.
2See Friedman (1956) and Brunner and Meltzer (1963) for the discussion along this line.
2The model in this paper has costly search in the goods market and the labor market. Costly
search in the goods market, together with particular patterns of preferences and production,
makes ﬁat money a valuable medium of exchange. In contrast to standard search models (e.g.,
Shi, 1995, and Trejos and Wright, 1995), money is divisible and goods can be stored as inventory
by the producers. The aggregate number of matches is an increasing function of buyers’ search
intensity and sellers’ inventory. Costly search in the labor market is modeled in the standard
way as in Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1990), where the aggregate number of matches is
an increasing function of the numbers of vacancies and unemployed workers. In both markets,
bargaining determines the terms of trade between the two agents in a match. This economy is
exposed to shocks to productivity and money growth.
In this model, velocity is determined by the “extensive margin” of trade. More precisely,
consumption velocity of money is equal to the frequency of trades per buyer in the goods market.
Because search is costly in the goods market, higher search intensity leads to a higher frequency
of trades for a buyer. On the other hand, costly search in the labor market delays the response
of employment to shocks and makes the output response sluggish. As a result, the supply of
goods and the trading frequency will also depend on sellers’ existing inventory. In equilibrium,
the frequency of trades per buyer is an increasing function of aggregate search intensity per buyer
and aggregate inventory per seller. Shocks change velocity of money by aﬀecting households’
decisions on buyers’ search intensity and sellers’ inventory. This is the mechanism we try to
capture with costly search in the two markets.
The mechanism propagates a shock as follows. When a shock is realized, consumption and
search intensity respond immediately. These initial responses will change the level of inventory in
the next period and, in the presence of sluggish output, they will also change the supply of goods
in the next period. The change in the future supply of goods will in turn change search intensity,
velocity and consumption in the future. Consider a positive shock to money growth, for example.
The shock immediately increases expected inﬂation, reduces the real money balance and hence
reduces consumption. With risk aversion, households try to reduce the fall in consumption by
3increasing buyers’ search intensity. Thus, velocity rises immediately. Moreover, since output is
sluggish due to costly labor market search, the fall in current consumption also increases inventory
and the supply of goods in the next period. With more goods available, consumption in the next
period will rise and households will reduce search intensity. Velocity will fall. These eﬀects in
the second period will persist as inventory and the supply of goods will decline only gradually
toward the stead state.
We calibrate the model to the US data. To focus on the role of search in explaining velocity,
we abstract from assets other than money. In the quantitative exercises, we take M2, rather than
M1, as the aggregate money stock. One reason is that M2 velocity is stable in the sample period
but M1 velocity is not. The other reason is that we want to compare our results with those
in Hodrick et al. (1991), who focused on M2 velocity. Also for comparability, we incorporate
both nominal shocks (to money growth) and real shocks (to productivity). The processes of these
shocks are estimated using the vector auto-regression (VAR).
We use the coeﬃcient of variation to measure the variability of a variable, as Hodrick et al.
(1991) do. Our model accounts well for the variability of consumption velocity of money. With
realistic parameter values, the model is able to capture about 90% of the variability of velocity
in the quarterly data. In contrast, Hodrick et al. (1991) can only generate a maximum 40% of
the variability of velocity in the data. Even this number was obtained with unrealistic values of
the real interest rate.
An obvious question is whether the high variability of velocity in our model is generated
by compromising the quantitative performance in other dimensions. The answer is no. To
support this answer, we examine the joint distribution of the second moments of other endogenous
variables. There are two main ﬁndings here. First, the higher variability of velocity in the model
is not generated by making output unrealistically volatile. To the contrary, the volatility of
output is about 60% of that in the data. Second, the correlations between endogenous variables
are realistic and some of them improve upon those obtained by Hodrick et al. (1991). A notable
example is the correlation between velocity and consumption growth. This correlation is negative
4in our model and the magnitude is comparable with that in the data. In contrast, the correlation
is either positive or close to zero in Hodrick et al. (1991).
Our ﬁndings seem to rely heavily on search in both the goods market and the labor market. If
there is no search in the goods market, then velocity will be determined by the intensive margin
of trade, as in traditional models of money, and hence it will not be volatile. On the other hand,
if there is no search in the labor market, then employment and output will respond to shocks
immediately. Since these responses change the supply of goods immediately, inventory plays a
much less important role in the supply of goods, and so velocity will be less volatile.
We also ﬁnd that shocks to money growth and productivity are both important for the model’s
performance. When there are no shocks to money growth, the model fails to capture some basic
monetary features in the data, such as the positive correlation between inﬂation and the nominal
interest rate. On the other hand, when productivity is ﬁxed, the volatility of velocity in the model
falls from 90% to 50% of that in the data. Moreover, the response of output to money growth
shocks alone is small.
Our model is related to three strands of literature. The ﬁrst is monetary search models, such
as Shi (1995) and Trejos and Wright (1995). We extend these models to allow for divisible money
and inventory. Relative to similar extensions carried out before (e.g., Shi, 1997, 1998, and Lagos
and Wright, 2002), the new dimensions of the current model are the stochastic components and
the quantitative exercises. The second strand of literature is search models of unemployment, e.g.,
Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1990). We follow this literature closely to model labor market
search. The third strand of literature empirically estimates the relationship between velocity and
other aggregate variables, e.g., Brunner and Meltzer (1963) and Lucas (1988). In contrast to this
literature, we compute an equilibrium model, as Hodrick et al. (1991) do. The advantage of an
equilibrium model is that it reveals how shocks aﬀect endogenous variables simultaneously.3
3Gordon and Leeper (2000) and Gordon et al. (1998) also compute general equilibrium models. Their analyses
have implications on the behavior of velocity. To create a positive value of money in the equilibrium, they assume
a transaction technology in the goods market which entails the use of money. Besides this diﬀerence in the model,
their focus is diﬀerent. They examine how agents’ expectations of monetary and ﬁscal policies aﬀect the trend and
cyclical features of velocity.
5It is useful to clarify that the shocks to money growth in this paper are not necessarily
monetary policy shocks. To identify policy shocks, we need to impose proper restrictions on
the VAR estimation of the shocks. Such identiﬁcation is important for analyzing the eﬀects of
policy shocks but it is quite subtle (see Christiano et al., 1999). Since the eﬀects of policy shocks
are not the focus in this paper, we follow Hodrick et al. (1991) to impose no restriction on the
VAR estimation. Nevertheless, our analysis may be a useful precursor to an investigation in the
propagation of monetary policy shocks, as we will discuss further in Section 7.
2. The Description of the Economy
2.1. The Household and Matches
The model economy has discrete time and many types of households. The number of households
in each type is large and normalized to one. A household of each type produces a speciﬁc good
which the household does not consume but which is desired by some other types of households.
Households meet with each other bilaterally ac c o r d i n gt oam a t c h i n gf u n c t i o nd e s c r i b e dl a t e r .
The focus of this analysis is on the matches with a single coincidence of wants, which we call trade
matches. In these matches, ﬁat money is used as a medium of exchange. Non-monetary trades
are not explicitly modeled here. However, to facilitate the calibration later, we summarize all
non-monetary trades as providing an amount of consumption that is exogenous to the household.4
Similarly, we abstract from all assets other than money.
The model has two elements that are not standard in search models. One is labor market
search and the other is inventory. As discussed in the introduction, both elements are important
for the volatility of velocity. To allow for inventory, we assume that goods can be stored by, and
only by, the producers. The presence of inventory does not destroy the essential role of money.
Because goods can only be stored by the producers, they cannot circulate as a means of payment.
Also, claims on inventory will not be valued in equilibrium, because a holder of a claim has zero
probability of meeting the issuer and redeeming the claims.
4For search models that explicitly model barter, see Kiyotaki and Wright (1991, 1993), Shi (1995, 1997) and
Trejos and Wright (1995).
6Random matching in the goods market can induce a non-degenerate distribution of money
holdings across agents. Keeping track of this distribution is analytically intractable and compu-
tationally diﬃcult. To maintain tractability, we extend the household structure in Lucas (1990)
to allow each household to perfectly smooth the matching risks. More precisely, each household
consists of a large number of members who regard the household’s utility as the common objec-
tive and carry out the household’s trading decisions. The members in a household do not have
incentives and hence do not make decisions; instead, the household makes all the decisions.5 With
this modeling device, the decisions are the same for all households in a symmetric equilibrium,
except for the types of goods they consume and produce. Thus, we can examine a representative
household’s decisions. To the extent that idiosyncratic matching risks can increase consumption
volatility, the risk-smoothing assumption under-estimates the variability of velocity.
Let us pick an arbitrary household of an arbitrary type as a “representative” household. Use
lower-case letters to denote this household’s decisions. Add a hat to other households’ decisions
and aggregate variables, which the representative household takes as given.
A household has ﬁve types of members at any given point of time. These types, and the
sizes in parentheses, are as follows: buyers (b), sellers/entrepreneur (np), employed workers (b nw),
unemployed workers (u), and leisure seekers (n0). The total size of a household’s members is 1;
i.e., the condition, b+np+b nw+u+n0 =1 ,a l w a y sh o l d s . 6 The hat on the symbol b nw signiﬁes the
fact that it is chosen by other households, because the representative household’s members who
work are employed by other households. For simplicity, we exclude home production from our
model. Among the ﬁve numbers, (b nw,n 0) are variables but (b,u,np) are assumed to be constant,
and so any change in the number of employed workers must be accompanied by an opposite
5As explained by Shi (1997), this household structure is intended to approximate a single agent’s decision
problem in the following way. The agent has one unit of time in each period and can divide the time into a large
number of bits. Matches take place over these bits of time. At the beginning of each period, the agent makes
all the trading decisions in the period and programs the decisions for each bit of time into a separate machine,
which corresponds to a member in the household structure. As the period unfolds, the machines carry out the
trades according to the programs. At the end of the period, the agent pools the receipts from the machines and
consumes. Similar risk-smoothing assumptions are used in labor economics (Rogerson, 1988, and Hansen, 1985).
For an alternative set of assumptions that achieves the same purpose, see Lagos and Wright (2002).
6One can explore an alternative household structure in which workers are also buyers in the goods market. If
the household can choose the intensity with which a worker performs each of the two roles, then this alternative
s t r u c t u r ew i l lb ei d e n t i c a lt oo u rm o d e l .
7change in the number of leisure seekers.7 Notice that we count entrepreneurs as being employed,
and so the total number of employed agents is (np + b nw). Deﬁne b l = b nw/np and B = b/np.
For each buyer, the household chooses the search eﬀort or intensity, e, and the terms of trade
to be proposed in each match. For each entrepreneur, the household chooses the number of
vacancies, v, and the wage rate to be proposed. The household’s utility in a period is
U(c) − (b nw + np)ϕ − bΦ(e) − npH(v).
Here U(c) is the utility of consumption; ϕ is the disutility of being employed (either as a worker
or as an entrepreneur); Φ(e) is the disutility of a buyer’s search intensity; and H(v)i st h ec o s to f
maintaining a number v of vacancies.8 Notice that all members consume the same amount as a
result of consumption sharing within the household. Assume that U(.) is strictly increasing and
concave, that Φ(.) is increasing and convex, and that Φ(0) = Φ0(0) = 0. The function H(.)h a s
properties similar to Φ(.).
In the labor market, an unemployed worker’s search eﬀort is assumed to be inelastic.9 We
assume that workers are only matched with other households that do not produce their consump-
tion goods. Thus, wages are paid in terms of money. Let b v be the number of vacancies per ﬁrm
in a period, so that the total number of vacancies is npb v.A si ss t a n d a r di nl a b o rs e a r c hm o d e l s
(see Blanchard and Diamond, 1989), the total number of matches between ﬁrms and workers is
given by a function (npb v)ψu1−ψ,w h e r eψ ∈ (0,1). The matching rate per vacancy is
b µ ≡ (npb v/u)
ψ−1 . (2.1)
For a ﬁrm with v vacancies, the number of matches is b µv. The matching rate per unemployed
worker is (npb v/u)
ψ. As in a typical search model of unemployment (e.g., Pissarides, 1990), each
7The assumption of a constant number of buyers is without loss of generality. Because we will endogenize buyers’
search intensity, the eﬀective number of buyers is endogenous. Allowing the household to choose the number of
buyers, as well as search intensity, complicates the algebra without adding new results. Similarly, the eﬀective
number of sellers is endogenous, as we will describe later.
8Alternatively, one can model the vacancy cost in terms of real resources. Then, the main analytical diﬀerence
will be that a change in the number of vacancies will aﬀect output directly, in addition to the indirect eﬀect through
employment. However, this direct eﬀect will be very small in the quantitative exercises, because the vacancy cost
is calibrated to be a very small fraction (2%) of the wage bill.
9Endogenizing an unemployed worker’s search intensity would improve the quantitative performance of the
model, but not by much. The reason is that unemployment is very persistent in the data and is much less volatile
than vacancy (see Layard et al., 1991).
8employed worker separates from the job with an exogenous probability δw ∈ (0,1) at the end of
each period.
We describe the matching function in the goods market similarly. Let b e be the search eﬀort
per buyer in a period so that bb e is the eﬀective number of buyers in the market. Let b k be the
level of inventory per seller at the beginning of a period and let s(b kt) be a function, explained
later, that converts a seller’s inventory into the seller’s intensity. The eﬀective number of sellers
in the market is nps(b k). The total number of trade matches is:
b G = g0(bb e)ξ[nps(b k)]1−ξ, ξ ∈ (0,1), (2.2)
where g0 > 0 is a constant.10 Denote z =( bb e)/[nps(b k)] as the tightness of the goods market. The
matching rate is b Gb per unit of buyer’s intensity and b Gs per unit of seller’s intensity, where
b Gb = g0zξ−1, b Gs = g0zξ. (2.3)
Thus, a buyer searching with intensity e gets a trade match with probability e b Gb and a seller
with an inventory k gets a trade match with probability s(k) b Gs.
The function s(k) requires an explanation. Its appearance in the matching function captures
the intuitive idea that the number of trade matches depends on inventory per seller, as well as
the number of sellers in the market. This is similar to the idea that the number of matches in the
labor market depends on the number of vacancies per ﬁrm as well as the number of ﬁrms. The
function s can be interpreted as the number of shops or warehouses per seller that are stocked
up. High inventory reduces the probability of stock-out, and hence increases the probability of
trade for the seller. We capture this beneﬁt of inventory to successful trades by assuming s0 > 0.
To rule out corner solutions for inventory, we also assume that this beneﬁt of inventory to the
match formation diminishes at the margin, i.e., s00 < 0.
10The Cobb-Douglas matching function is convenient because it is used in the labor market. Changing the
matching function can aﬀect the results primarily by changing the elasticity of the matching rates to the market
tightness. This elasticity is captured by ξ in the Cobb-Douglas function. Later in section 6.1, we will ﬁnd that the
quantitative results are not sensitive to ξ. In this sense, our results might also be robust to mild changes in the
form of the matching function.
92.2. Aggregate Shocks and the Timing of Events
There are two aggregate shocks in the economy, one to productivity and the other to the money
growth rate. Let l be the number of workers per ﬁrm, deﬁned as lt = nwt/np. Output of a ﬁrm
is yt = f(lt)=Atlα
t ,w h e r eA is stochastic and α ∈ (0,1) is a constant.11 To describe money
growth, let Mt denote the aggregate money stock per household in period t. At the beginning of
period t +1 ,al u m p - s u mt r a n s f e r( γt+1 − 1)Mt is given to each household. Thus, the aggregate
money stock grows between t and t + 1 at a gross rate γt+1 = Mt+1/Mt. We assume that lnA
and γ follow ﬁrst-order vector auto-regressive processes, which will be described in Section 4.
Because the money stock grows over time, nominal variables are not stationary. To maintain
stationarity, we follow the convention (e.g., Lucas, 1990) to normalize nominal variables by the
aggregate money stock. We also suppress the time subscript t whenever it is possible and shorten
t h et i m es u b s c r i p tt ± j to ±j for j ≥ 1.
The events in a period unfold in the following sequence. At the beginning of the period, the
two aggregate shocks are realized and each household receives monetary transfers. The aggregate
money stock is measured as M after the shocks are realized. Also measured at this time are the
representative household’s endogenous state variables: money holdings, m,t h el e v e lo fi n v e n t o r y
per ﬁrm in the household, k, and the number of employed workers per ﬁrm in the household, l.
Next, the household chooses the number of vacancies for each ﬁrm to maintain, v,a n ds e a r c h
intensity for each buyer, e. The household also chooses the wage rate w for each ﬁrm to oﬀer in
a match that was formed in the previous period and chooses the terms of trade for each buyer
to oﬀer in a current match in the goods market, (q,x). Here, x is the quantity of money that
the buyer oﬀers to the seller and q is the quantity of goods the buyer asks for. After these
decisions, the members go to the markets, matches are formed, and the members carry out the
trades according to the household’s instructions. In the meantime, the workers who were matched
two or more periods ago and who have not separated from the ﬁrms produce and obtain wages.
11This production function implicitly incorporates the entrepreneur’s own labor input. For example, we can
rewrite the production function as f(l)=Al
α1
1−α0
,f o rs o m eα
0 ∈ (0,1 − α], where the entrepreneur’s labor input
is one unit.
10Then, the members go home and pool the receipts from the trades. Every member consumes the
same amount, c. Finally, exogenous separation occurs with probability δw to matches that just
produced (which do not include the matches newly formed in the current period). Also, inventory
depreciates at rate δk.
Let us clarify a few aspects of the above description. First, to avoid double counting the time
that is available to an agent, we assume that a worker who ﬁnds a job in a period starts working
in the next period rather than the current period. Second, this one-period delay in employment
does not create wage rigidity, because we assume that the wage rate for a newly matched worker
is negotiated when the worker starts to worker. This explains why the wage oﬀer w in the current
period is for the workers who formed matches in the previous period. Third, the variables m, x
and w are all normalized by M, and so they are stationary despite money growth.
2.3. The Household’s Decision Problem
Before laying out the representative household’s decision problem, we describe the household’s
trading decisions ﬁrst. Denote the household’s value function as J(m,npk,npl), where the depen-
dence on aggregate variables is suppressed. Denote the expected marginal value of each of the


















Here the expectations are conditional on the information available in the current period after the
shocks are realized. Notice that the future value of money is discounted by the money growth
rate γ+1,a sw e l la sb yβ, because m is a variable normalized by the aggregate money stock.
Consider a match in the labor market that was formed in the previous period between a
ﬁrm in the representative household and a worker from another household. For this match, the
representative household instructs the ﬁrm to oﬀer a wage rate w in the current period. We
assume that the ﬁrm makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer, and so the wage oﬀer gives the worker zero
11surplus.12 The wage payment to the worker adds to the worker’s household’s money holdings
at the end of the current period. Thus, the utility value of the wage payment to the worker’s
household is wb ωm, and the worker’s surplus is (wb ωm − ϕ). Setting this surplus to zero, we have
w = ϕ/b ωm . (2.6)
T h ew o r k e rw i l la c c e p tt h ew a g eo ﬀer: Although the worker receives zero surplus, a ﬁrm can
always increase the wage rate slightly to induce the worker to accept the oﬀer with probability
one. Similarly, the wage rate in the current period for a worker in the representative household
employed by other households is b w = ϕ/ωm. Notice that the tightness of the labor market aﬀects
the wage rate only indirectly through its equilibrium eﬀect on the shadow value of money, because
the matching rates appear only in the laws of motion of the endogenous state variables.
Now consider a match in the goods market between a buyer from the representative household
and a seller from another household. The decision by the buyer’s household is to prescribe the
quantity of money that the buyer gives to the seller, x, and the quantity of goods, q, that the
buyer asks the seller to provide. In contrast to the labor market, making the assumption of one
side taking all in a match in the goods market would lead to trivial results. The buyer must
obtain positive surplus in order for money to have positive value, and the seller must obtain
positive surplus in order to have incentive to accumulate inventory.
To give positive surplus to both sides of the match, we use the following trading protocol:
The buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer, but his oﬀer is constrained by the requirement that it
should give the seller a surplus greater than or equal to θ b ∆,w h e r eθ ∈ (0,1) and b ∆ is the total
surplus in a similar match. This trading protocol is a short-cut to a more elaborate setting where
the buyer and seller can both propose the trading quantities prescribed by their households, with
the seller being chosen to propose with probability θ and the buyer with probability (1 − θ)i n
each round of bargaining (e.g., Shi, 2001). It is useful to emphasize that these trading quantities
12We make this assumption in order to simplify the model. If Nash bargaining is assumed, instead, there will be
an additional unidenﬁable parameter in the calibration, i.e., the worker’s bargaining power. This bargaining power
aﬀects workers’ search behavior signiﬁcantly only when workers’ search eﬀort is elastic. Since workers’ search eﬀort
is quite inelastic in the data (and is ﬁxed in the model), using Nash bargaining to determine wages may have only
small eﬀects on the model’s quantitative results.
12are prescribed before the match is formed and hence are committed to by the households. In
Section 6.2 we will examine the alternative setting where the trading quantities are determined
ex post by Nash bargaining.
A successful trade in the goods market gives the seller x units of (normalized) money, whose
value to the seller’s household is b ωmx. The seller’s opportunity cost of the trade is the value of the
goods traded. If the seller keeps the goods, a fraction δk will depreciate and the remaining will have
av a l u e( 1− δk)b ωkq. Thus, the seller’s expected surplus from the trade is [b ωmx − (1 − δk)b ωkq].
(The surplus is evaluated with marginal values of the traded objects because each member is
inﬁnitesimal in the household.) Since the buyer makes the oﬀers, he will push the seller’s surplus
down to the minimum, θ b ∆. Thus, the quantities of trade satisfy
q =
b ωmx − θ b ∆
(1 − δk)b ωk
. (2.7)
The buyer’s surplus of trade is [U0(c)q − ωmx], and the total surplus of trade in the match is
∆ =[ U0(c) − (1 − δk)b ωk]q.
Analogous to ∆, the total surplus in a trade match between an arbitrary buyer and an
arbitrary seller is b ∆.T h a ti s ,
b ∆ =
£
U0(b c) − (1 − δk)b ωk
¤
b q. (2.8)
We now use dynamic programming to formulate the representative household’s decision prob-
lem. In each period, the endogenous state variables for the household are (m,k,l)a n dt h ec h o i c e
variables are (q,x,w,c,e,v,m+1,k +1,l +1). Taking the aggregate variables as given, the represen-
tative household solves:
(PH) J(m,npk,npl)=m a x
(




The constraints are (2.6), (2.7) and the following:
m/b ≥ x; (2.9)
b Gbbeq + db c ≥ c; (2.10)
13(1 − δw)l + b µv ≥ l+1, δw ∈ (0,1); (2.11)
(1 − δk)
"









m +( γ+1 − 1) +
h
b Gsnps(k)b x − b Gbbex
i
+ np( b wb l − wl)
o
≥ m+1. (2.13)
In addition, there are non-negativity constraints on (x,l,k,m), which we omit.
The constraints (2.6) and (2.7) come from the earlier discussion on the terms of trade. Con-
straint (2.9) is the money constraint in a trade match. It must be satisﬁed for every buyer in a
trade match because household members are temporarily separated in the exchange.
Constraint (2.10) states that the household’s consumption consists of goods obtained from
monetary and non-monetary trades in the period. The amount from all monetary trades is the
amount in each trade match, q, times the number of trade matches. The amount from non-
monetary trades is db c,w h e r ed ∈ (0,1) is a constant. This amount is introduced purely for the
convenience of calibration and it is taken as given by the individual household.
Constraint (2.11) is the law of motion of employment in each ﬁrm in the household. It states
that the number of workers employed in the ﬁrm next period will consist of retained workers and
new hires in the current period. Similarly, constraint (2.12) is the law of motion of inventory
held by each ﬁrm in the household. It states that inventory per seller at the beginning of next
period will consist of inventory that is not depreciated at the end of the current period. During
the current period, new output adds to inventory and sales reduce inventory. The amount of
goods sold for money by each seller is b Gss(k)b q and the amount of non-monetary sales is db c/np.
Again, for the convenience of calibration, we introduce an amount of ﬁxed investment, b fI,w h e r e
I ∈ (0,1) is a constant. The individual household takes this amount as given.
Finally, (2.13) is the law of motion of the household’s money holdings. It states that changes in
the household’s money holdings between two adjacent periods come from the monetary transfer
at the beginning of next period, (γ+1 − 1), buying and selling in the current goods market,
and buying and selling of labor services. The factor 1/γ+1 appears on the left-hand side of the
constraint because money holdings are normalized by the aggregate money stock.
142.4. Optimal Decisions
To ﬁnd the conditions for optimal choices, note ﬁrst that (2.11)—(2.13) all hold with equality,
provided that (ωm,ωk,ωl) are positive. Use these equalities to substitute for m+1,k +1 and l+1 in
the objective function of (PH). Also, (2.10) holds with equality and we use it to substitute for c.
Next, substitute q from (2.7). Let the shadow price of (2.9) be b Gbbeλ,w h e r e b Gbbe is the number
of matches in which the household’s buyers face the constraint (2.9). The ﬁrst-order conditions
of v, e and x are as follows:
for v: H0(v)=b µωl; (2.14)
for e: Φ0(e)= b Gb[U0(c)q − ωmx]; (2.15)
for x: U0(c)
b ωm
(1 − δk)b ωk
= ωm + λ. (2.16)
Condition (2.14) requires that the marginal cost and the expect marginal beneﬁto fav a c a n c y
be equal to each other. The amount b µωl is the expected marginal beneﬁt of a vacancy, since an
additional vacancy will result in a match with probability b µ which will increase the ﬁrm’s em-
ployment next period. Similarly, (2.15) requires that the marginal cost to a buyer from increasing
search intensity be equal to the marginal beneﬁt, the latter of which is the buyer’s surplus from
a trade times the probability of a match.
Condition (2.16) is the optimal condition for the quantity of money traded in a match, x.T o
interpret it, note from (2.7) that the additional quantity of goods that a buyer can entice the
seller to produce for one additional unit of money is b ωm/[(1 − δk)b ωk]. Thus, the left-hand side
of (2.16) is the buyer’s value of a marginal unit of money spent in a trade. The right-hand side
is the cost of money, which consists of the opportunity cost of giving up an additional unit of
money, ωm, and the resulting cost of facing a tighter trading constraint (2.9), λ.
We can also derive the envelope conditions for money holdings (m), employment per ﬁrm (l),











(1 − δw)ωl+1 +
£





(1 − δk)ωk+1 + b Gs+1s0(k+1)[ωm+1b x+1 − (1 − δk)ωk+1b q+1]
o
. (2.19)
Again, the expectations are conditional on the information available in the current period after
the shocks are realized.
Since (2.17) — (2.19) have similar interpretations, we explain only (2.19). This condition
characterizes optimal inventory in the next period, k+1. If a seller has one additional unit of
inventory at the beginning of next period, the seller’s matching probability will increase by
b Gs+1s0(k+1). Once in a match, the seller’s surplus will be [ωm+1b x+1−(1−δk)ωk+1b q+1]. Thus, the
service generated by one unit of inventory next period is equal to the product of these two terms.
In addition, each unit of inventory will have a value (1−δk)ωk+1 two periods later. The right-hand
side of (2.19) is the expected sum of this future value and the service, properly discounted. If k+1
is chosen optimally, then this sum is equal to the marginal value of capital, ωk, as (2.19) requires.
It is clear that inventory generates a positive service only if s0 > 0 and if a seller obtains a
positive share (θ) of the match surplus. If either s0 =0o rθ = 0, then inventory is positive only
when the expected value of inventory grows at a gross rate 1/(1−δk). In this case, there cannot
be a stationary level of inventory in equilibrium.
3. Equilibrium and Velocity
The following deﬁnes a symmetric search equilibrium:
Deﬁnition 3.1. For any given initial state (m0,k 0,l 0) and the exogenous shock processes, a
symmetric monetary search equilibrium consists of each household’s choice variables j and other
households’ choices b j,w h e r ej ≡ (c,x,q,w,e,v,m+1,l +1,k +1), such that (i) j solves (PH) under
given b j and (m,l,k);( i i )j = b j; and (iii) the values of ωmm+1, ωll+1,a n dωkk+1 all lie in (0,∞).
The requirements (i) and (ii) are self-explanatory. Notice that symmetry implies m =1i n
equilibrium. With symmetry, we will suppress the hat on aggregate variables. The condition (iii)
requires that money, employment and inventory all have positive values in equilibrium in order
16for the analysis on these stock variables to be meaningful. The condition also requires that the
total value of each stock variable be bounded in order for the ﬁrst-order conditions to characterize
the optimal choices.
We assume that the trading restriction (2.9) binds in all periods, i.e., λ > 0. The reason for
making this assumption is that, if λ = 0, then money only performs the role of a store of value
in that period but not the role of a medium of exchange. In the quantitative exercises we will
ensure λ > 0, for which the restriction γ > β is imposed.13
With the restriction λ > 0 and the result m =1 ,w eh a v ex =1 /b in equilibrium. Thus, the
price level, normalized by the aggregate money stock, is p = x/q =1 /(bq). The gross rate of
inﬂation between two adjacent periods is p+1M+1/(pM)=γ+1q/q+1.
We can reduce the equilibrium system to a dynamic system of ﬁve variables (l,k,v,ωk,ωm).
This is done in the following steps. First, we substitute x =1 /b and express the matching rates
as µ = µ(v), Gb = Gb(e,k), and Gs = Gs(e,k). Second, we substitute w = ϕ/ωm from (2.6) and
ωl = h(v) from (2.14), where
h(v) ≡ H0(v)/µ(v). (3.1)
















Φ0(e)/Gb(e,k)=( 1− θ)q[U0 − (1 − δk)ωk]. (3.5)
13The assumption λ > 0 in all periods strengthens our results since it underestimates the variability of velocity
in the model. If λ = 0 in some periods, velocity would be more volatile between periods. However, the extent of
this underestimation is small because the data has γ > β in most periods.
17Jointly solving (3.2) — (3.5), we express (c,e,q,λ)a sf u n c t i o n so f( k,ωm,ωk). Finally, substituting
the above results into (2.11), (2.12) and (2.17) — (2.19), we have the following dynamic system:
l+1 =( 1− δw)l + vµ(v),
k+1 =( 1− δk)
h
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(3.6)
In this system, (k,l) are predetermined variables and others are jump variables.















Velocity is proportional to a buyer’s trading frequency and so it depends only on the extensive
margin of trade. In turn, the extensive margin depends only on buyers’ search intensity, e,a n d
sellers’ inventory, k.G i v e ne and k, velocity does not depend on the intensive margin of trade,
i.e., not on the quantity of goods traded in each match. The reason for this result is simple.
B e c a u s ep r i c e sa r ef u l l yﬂexible in this model, any change in q will result in opposite changes in
consumption and the price level, which will leave the product pq and hence velocity independent
of q for given (e,k). Thus, changes in q can aﬀect velocity only indirectly by aﬀecting e and k.
It is useful to anticipate the immediate impact of shocks on velocity. Consider ﬁrst a positive
shock to the money growth rate. Because inventory is predetermined, the immediate impact of
this shock on velocity goes through buyers’ search intensity. A buyer will search more intensively
if and only if the shock increases the buyer’s surplus in a trade. This surplus is the product of
the quantity of goods traded in a match, q, and the buyer’s surplus per unit of good, (1−θ)[U0−
(1−δk)ωk] (see (3.5)). Higher money growth is likely to aﬀect these two dimensions of a buyer’s
surplus in opposite directions and hence to have an ambiguous impact on velocity. On the one
18hand, higher money growth increases anticipated inﬂation and reduces the real purchasing power
of money. This eﬀect will reduce the quantity of goods that a buyer obtains in a trade, q.O n
the other hand, higher money growth will increase the buyer’s surplus per unit of good. This
is because consumption is more valuable when consumption is low. As higher money growth
reduces the household’s consumption, an additional unit of good obtained from the trade has
ah i g h e rb e n e ﬁt to the household. This indirect eﬀect is stronger if the household is more risk
averse. Thus, the higher the relative risk aversion, the stronger the indirect (positive) eﬀect of
money growth on a buyer’s surplus, and the more likely that a buyer will search intensively.
The impact of a positive technology shock on velocity is opposite to that of a money growth
shock. By increasing the supply of goods, a positive technology shock increases q and reduces
the marginal value of goods to the consumer. Thus, when the shock is realized, search intensity
and velocity will fall if the relative risk aversion is high and will rise otherwise.
After the immediate impact, the shock will continue to aﬀect search intensity, velocity and
output in future periods. This propagation mechanism will depend on a number of factors such
as inventory and labor market search. We will explore this mechanism later in Section 5.3.
4. Calibration and Computation
We calibrate the model to the quarterly US data (see Appendix A for a description of the data).
The sample covers the period 1959:II — 1998:III and is ﬁltered using the HP ﬁlter. We also include
the results for the sub-sample 1959:II — 1988:I, which Hodrick et al. (1991) examined.
















where N1 is a 2 × 1 vector and N2 a2× 2m a t r i x .W ec a l lεm the shock to money growth and
εA the productivity shock. As clariﬁed in the introduction, we impose no restriction on the VAR
estimation, and so εm is not necessarily a shock to monetary policy. Also as explained in the
introduction, we use M2 as the monetary aggregate to compute γ. To construct the time series
of log productivity, we interpret f(l)=Alα as aggregate labor income and calculate it to be 64%
19of GDP (see Christiano, 1988). Normalize the steady state level of A as A∗ =1a n di d e n t i f yα
through the procedure described later. Then, using the data of (f,l), we obtain the time series
of log productivity as ln(At)=l n ( ft) − αln(lt).
The results of the VAR estimation are reported in Table 1. As the table shows, the ﬁrst-order
speciﬁcation is good. Also, lnA is positively correlated with lagged money growth.
Table 1 here.
The above procedure diﬀers from that in Hodrick et al. (1991, Table 2) in two aspects. First,
Hodrick et al. examine endowment economies, rather than productive economies, and so output
ﬂuctuations are caused entirely by exogenous endowment shocks. In our model, output can
be caused by endogenous ﬂuctuations in employment as well as exogenous productivity shocks.
Second, we use log productivity in the VAR speciﬁcation, but Hodrick et al. use endowment
growth in the speciﬁcation. This diﬀerence reﬂects the diﬀerence in the treatment of the data.
Hodrick et al. do not ﬁlter the data, in which case it is appropriate to assume that the growth
rate of endowment is stationary. In contrast, we ﬁlter the data, and so it is appropriate to assume
that the level (or the log level) of productivity is stationary.14 Because of these diﬀerences, the
variability of velocity is comparable between the models only as a percentage of the variability of
velocity in the corresponding data to which the model is calibrated.











Here, η, εk, εe, ϕ, ϕ0 and H0 are all positive constants. The constant εk measures the curvature
of a seller’s searching intensity function. In the search cost function, ϕ is the disutility of em-
ployment, ϕ0 is the eﬃciency units of a buyer’s search intensity relative to a worker’s time, and
εe measures the elasticity of buyers’ search intensity.
14In a previous version of this paper, we calibrated the model to the unﬁltered data and still found that the
variability of velocity is much larger than in Hodrick et al. (1991).
20We identify the model separately for the sample 1959:II — 1998:III and the sample 1959:II
— 1988:I. The identiﬁed parameter values from the shorter sample are put in parentheses in the
following description. Set β =0 .9952 (0.9958) to match the sample mean of the quarterly real
interest rate, 0.4809% (0.4191%). The gross rate of money growth in the steady state matches the
sample average γ∗ =1 .01724 (1.02014). Set I =0 .269 to match the ratio of ﬁxed investment to
output in the data (see Christiano, 1988). Set d =0 .25, which is a realistic number for the fraction
of purchases made through non-monetary trades.15 The share of vacancies in the formation of
labor market matches is set at ψ =0 .6 and the job separation rate at δw =0 .06. Both of which
are consistent with the estimates by Blanchard and Diamond (1989).
The parameters (η,ξ,θ,εe,εk,B) cannot be identiﬁed. To address this problem, we will ﬁrst
set these parameters to certain values in the benchmark case and then examine the sensitivity of
the results to changes in these parameters. The relative risk aversion is set at η =4a n da l l o w e d
to vary in the range [0.2, 8]. These values are comparable with those in Hodrick et al. (1991).
Also, set the share of buyers’ search in the formation of matches to ξ =0 .8, the sellers’ surplus
share in a match to θ =0 .2, the elasticity of buyers’ search intensity to εe = 2, the parameter in
a seller’s search intensity function to εk = 13, and the ratio of buyers to sellers to B =0 .5. The
sensitivity analysis on (ξ,θ,εe,εk,B) will appear in Section 6.1.
The remaining parameters, including the parameter α in the production function, are iden-
tiﬁed by matching the model’s predictions with the following facts. (i) The labor participation
rate is 0.6282 (0.6148) and the unemployment rate is 0.0605 (0.0611); (ii) The inventory/output
ratio is 0.9 and the inventory investment/output ratio is 0.0065; (iii) Income velocity of money
is 1.7440 (1.6882); (iv) The share of labor income in output is 0.64 (Christiano, 1988) and the
hiring cost is 2% of the wage cost (which is in the range surveyed by Hamermesh 1993); (v) The
shopping time of the population is 11.17% of the working time and the working time is 30% of
agents’ discretionary time (Juster and Staﬀord, 1991). In Appendix B we detail the procedure to
use the above restrictions to solve the parameters.
15Avery et al. (1986) report that US households perform about 82% of their purchases with money.
21The parameter values are listed in the upper panel of Table 2. The lower panel of Table 2
reports steady state values of some endogenous variables.
Table 2 here.
To compute the model, we use the standard method described by Blanchard and Kahn (1980).
That is, we linearize the equilibrium dynamic system in Section 3 around the steady state and
ﬁnd the corresponding saddle path that is consistent with rational expectations.
We simulate the model and compute the unconditional moments of some key variables and
their correlations that Hodrick et al. (1991) examine.16 The draws of the shocks are restricted
to satisfy γ > β, so as to ensure λ > 0. As in Hodrick et al., we measure the variability (or





Also, deﬁne the following variables:
inﬂation rate: π = γq−1/q − 1
real interest rate: r = U0(c−1)/[βU0(c)] − 1
nominal interest rate: i = γωm−1/(βωm) − 1
consumption growth: gc = c/c−1
These deﬁnitions are standard. Despite the fact that our model does not have asset markets,
interest rates are still meaningful concepts here. For example, if a government can introduce
nominal bonds that are not transferable between agents, then the interest rate on such bonds
will be the one deﬁned above. Similarly, if each household has a technology to store consumption
goods, then the real interest rate deﬁned above will serve as a lower bound on the rate of return
to such storage.
5. Model Predictions
Tables 3.1a n d3 .2 report the unconditional moments of variables, where the standard deviations
of the moments over the simulations appear in brackets. In these tables, we choose ﬁve diﬀerent
16The total number of simulation is 1000. Standard deviations of second order moments are calculated over these
rounds of simulation.
22values of the relative risk aversion, η (0.2, 2, 4, 6, and 8), where η = 4 is the benchmark value.17
Means and standard deviations of inﬂation and interest rates are almost constant, and so they
are not reported here. It is clear from the two tables that the results are very similar for the
period 1959:II - 1988:I (which was examined by Hodrick et al., 1991) and for the period 1959:II
- 1998:III. In the following discussion, we refer only to the results for the longer period.
Tables 3.1a n d3 .2 here.
5.1. The Mean and Variability of Velocity
The mean of consumption velocity matches the data well. For a large range of the relative risk
aversion (from 0.2t o8 ) ,t h em e a no fv e l o c i t yv a r i e so n l ys l i g h t l yf r o m1 .2238 to 1.2240, which
is close to the observed mean, 1.2702. The reason for the close match is that we calibrated
the steady-state income velocity to that in the data. This procedure yields a realistic mean of
consumption velocity, provided that the ratio of consumption to output is realistic and stable.
Our model also explains a large fraction of the variability of velocity in the data. In the
benchmark case (η = 4), for example, the coeﬃcient of variation in velocity is about 90% of the
value in the data. Even for η as low as 0.2, the model generates 57% of the variability of velocity
in the data. As the relative risk aversion increases, velocity becomes more volatile. When η is
equal to or greater than 6, the model even generates higher variability of velocity than in the data.
In contrast, Hodrick et al. (1991, Table 6) were able to explain at most 40% of the variability in
the data. This maximum variability was obtained under extreme parameter values η =9 .5a n d
β =0 .975, which imply a quarterly real interest rate (2.6%) that is much higher than the sample
value (0.42%). We choose β to match the observed mean of the real interest rate. Even with this
realistic value of β and a smaller η, our model is able to capture a much higher percentage of the
variability in the data.
Of course, a high variability of velocity is meaningful only when it is viewed relatively to the
17When investigating the sensitivity of the numerical results to one parameter, we repeat the procedure in
Appendix B to identify other parameters again. So, a change in one parameter may entail changes in other
parameters in order to satisfy the restrictions in the identifying procedure. If this leads to a change in the value of
α,w er e c o n s t r u c tt h es e r i e s{lnAt} for the VAR estimation.
23volatility of other aggregate variables such as output. Volatile velocity in our model is not caused
by artiﬁcially setting the entire model to be more volatile than in the data. To see this, we include
the coeﬃcient of variation of output, cv(y), in Tables 3.1a n d3 .2. In all simulations, output in
the model is less volatile than in the data. In the benchmark case (η = 4), the model captures
about 60% of the volatility of output in the data.
Velocity is volatile in our model because it is determined by the extensive margin of trade. As
households change search intensity to keep consumption smooth, the extensive margin of trade
can respond to shocks signiﬁcantly. As explained near the end of Section 3, a household changes
search intensity more signiﬁcantly when it is more risk averse. Thus, it is not surprising to see
the result in Table 3.2 that velocity is more volatile when the risk aversion is higher.
5.2. Correlations between Variables
To ensure that the high variability of velocity does not come at the expense of the model’s
performance in other dimensions, we examine the correlations between the key variables. These
correlations have the correct signs and their magnitudes are comparable with those in the data,
provided that the relative risk aversion is not very low. First, velocity is negatively correlated with
consumption growth and positively with the nominal interest rate. Second, inﬂation is positively
correlated with the nominal interest rate and negatively with the real interest rate. In contrast,
some of these correlations are unrealistic in Hodrick et al. (1991, Table 6). In particular, the
correlation between velocity and consumption growth in their paper ranges from −0.0 6 9t o0 .664,
which is very diﬀerent from the value in the data (−0.3537).
The negative correlation between velocity and consumption growth is important because it is
indicative of how the extensive and intensive margins of trade respond to the shocks. Recall that
the extensive margin is the trading frequency and the intensive margin is the quantity of goods
traded in each match, q. While velocity depends only on the extensive margin, consumption
depends on both margins. The negative correlation between velocity and consumption growth
reﬂects the fact that these two margins of trade often respond to a shock in opposite directions.
For example, when a positive shock to productivity increases consumption, the households reduce
24buyers’ search intensity because there is not much need to search intensively when goods are
abundant. Similarly, when a positive shock to money growth reduces consumption by reducing
the purchasing power of money, the households try to smooth consumption by increasing buyers’
search intensity. When the relative risk aversion is high, this motive of using search intensity
to smooth consumption is strong and the resulting eﬀect on the extensive margin dominates the
eﬀect on the intensive margin.
In traditional models, such as the ones in Hodrick et al. (1991), the extensive margin of trade
is not important for the equilibrium. It is then not surprising that these models have diﬃculty
to generate a signiﬁcantly negative correlation between velocity and consumption growth.
5.3. Propagation of the Shocks
Search intensity and the supply of goods play important roles in the propagation of shocks. To
assess this propagation mechanism, we study the dynamic eﬀects of the shocks. We do this by
ﬁrst analyzing the cross-correlations between some key variables and then presenting the impulse
responses of the equilibrium to the shocks.
In Table 4 we present the cross-correlations of search intensity and inventory with log-
productivity and money growth. The following features of the cross-correlations are noteworthy.
First, search intensity is negatively correlated with past, present and future productivity, while
positively correlated with past, present and future money growth. Inventory is positively corre-
lated with past, present and future productivity, while negatively correlated with past, present
and future money growth. Second, the highest correlation between money growth and search
intensity is the contemporaneous correlation. This indicates that search intensity responds to a
money growth shock by the most at the time of the shock. In contrast, the highest correlation
between search intensity and productivity is between current intensity and one-period lagged pro-
ductivity, which indicates a hump-shaped response of search intensity to a negative productivity
shock. Third, consistent with the data, the highest correlations between inventory and the shocks
are between current inventory and the shocks with some lags. This delay in the peak response of
25inventory occurs because it is costly to build up inventory.
Table 4 here.
Figure 3 depicts the impulse responses of the equilibrium to a positive shock to productiv-
ity, while the money growth shock is maintained at zero. These impulse responses reveal the
following propagation mechanism. At the impact of the shock, the supply of goods increases,
which increases consumption and reduces the need to search. As a result, velocity falls. Some
of the increased supply of goods in the current period ends up in next period’s inventory. This
increased inventory and the persistence in productivity will keep the supply of goods in the next
period above the steady state. As a result, consumption in the next period will be above the
steady state. Households will continue to reduce search intensity and velocity will continue to
fall. This pattern continues for several periods until productivity falls back toward the steady
state suﬃciently. At that point of time, the supply of goods and consumption have dissipated
suﬃciently toward the steady state. Search intensity starts to rise, which induces velocity to rise
toward the steady state. In this adjustment, search intensity, inventory and velocity all have
hump-shaped responses, while output and consumption adjust monotonically.
An unconventional feature of this adjustment is that employment responds negatively to a
positive productivity shock. Although there is an on-going debate on whether this negative
response is indeed present in the US data (e.g., Gali, 1999, and Christiano et al., 2003), its
presence in our model seems intuitive. A positive productivity shock makes goods more abundant
and reduces the expected match surplus per trade for a seller. As a result of this lower surplus,
ﬁrms reduce employment. Employment continues to fall in the ﬁrst few periods of the transition
as buyers’ lower search intensity further reduces a seller’s expected match surplus. Only after
several periods does employment start rising toward the steady state.
F i g u r e3a n dF i g u r e4h e r e .
Figure 4 depicts the impulse responses of the equilibrium to a positive shock to money growth,
while the productivity shock is maintained at zero. Supporting the discussion in Section 3,
26the shock immediately reduces consumption, increases the incentive to search, and increases
velocity immediately. These immediate responses are qualitatively opposite to those under a
positive productivity shock. However, one period after the shock and onward, the responses
of the equilibrium are similar to those under a positive productivity shock. In particular, in
the second period after the shock, consumption will jump above the steady state, while search
intensity and velocity will fall below the steady state. Thereafter, the adjustment follows the
same pattern as the one depicted in Figure 3.
The reversal of the adjustment in period 2 is caused by two features of the estimated VAR
structure. First, the money growth shock is not persistent. One period after the shock, money
growth returns to levels that are very close to the steady state. Second, the estimated VAR has a
positive correlation between current productivity and past money growth. Thus, a positive shock
to current money growth increases future productivity. These induced changes in productivity
are the driving forces of the responses one period after the shock.
Taken together, Figure 3 and Figure 4 show that changes in productivity, either directly
or indirectly through their eﬀect on money growth, exert a dominant force on velocity and its
co-movement with consumption and output.
5.4. The Roles of the Two Shocks and Labor Market Search
In this subsection, we investigate the roles of costly search and the shocks. First, productivity
shocks are necessary for generating suﬃcient volatility in velocity. To illustrate this point, we
ﬁx productivity at the steady state level and simulate the model. The results are reported in
the top panel in Table 5. As in the model with both shocks, money growth shocks alone still
generate negative correlations between velocity and consumption growth, and between inﬂation
and the real interest rate. However, velocity is much less volatile than with productivity shocks.
For example, with η =4 ,t h ec o e ﬃcient of variation in velocity is about 50% of that in the data,
as opposed to 90% when there are productivity shocks. Also, the model without productivity
shocks can only explain a small fraction (about 10%) of the volatility of output in the data.
Second, money shocks are necessary for explaining some basic features of the data. In the
27middle panel of Table 5, we report the simulation results with only productivity shocks, where
the money growth rate is ﬁxed at the steady state level. Although velocity and output are still
volatile in the absence of money growth shocks, the correlation between inﬂation and the nominal
interest rate is negative, which is counter-factual. Also, inﬂation and the real interest rate are
almost perfectly and negatively correlated with each other. The corresponding correlation in the
data is much smaller.
Table 5 here.
Third, the non-Walrasian feature of the goods market, modeled as search, is important for
generating the variability of velocity in the model. This is simply because velocity is determined
by the extensive margin of trade. If the goods market were Walrasian, then the extensive margin
of trade would not be important for velocity and hence velocity would not be volatile.
Finally, labor market search is important for the model’s performance. To see this, we compute
the model under the alternative assumption that the labor market clears in every period in the
Walrasian style. That is, the following equation always holds:
(1 − δk)ωkf0(l)=ωmw = ϕ. (5.1)
This equation determines the level of employment in each ﬁrm, l.T h eﬁr s tp a r to ft h i se q u a t i o ni s
the marginal product of labor and the second part is the wage rate, both being valued in utility.
In this alternative economy, the dynamics of (k,ωk,ωm) still obey (3.6) in Section 3, but the
equation for l is replaced by (5.1) and the equation for v is no longer relevant. Calibrating this
model to the data (1959:II — 1998:III), we compute the moments.18
The results are reported in the bottom panel in Table 5. Without labor market search, both
velocity and output are much less volatile than with labor market search. Consider the case
η = 4, for example. Without labor market search, the model captures about 70% of the volatility
of velocity in the data, as opposed to 90% when there is labor market search, and 40% of the
volatility of output in the data, as opposed to 60% when there is labor market search.




28To explain why velocity is less volatile when labor market search is shut down, consider a
positive shock to money growth. Suppose that buyers increase search intensity, as in the case
with labor market search. Because high search intensity generates a positive externality to sellers,
a ﬁrm’s expected surplus from the goods market increases. Anticipating this higher surplus, ﬁrms
will increase employment. Thus, output and the supply of goods will likely rise immediately when
the shock is realized. This increase in the supply of goods will reduce buyers’ incentive to search.
That is, search intensity will respond by less to the shock, and hence velocity will be less volatile,
than if search is required in the labor market.
6. Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we examine the sensitivity of the quantitative results to some parameters and to
the bargaining rule in the goods market.
6.1. Sensitivity to the Parameters
So far we have chosen the following parameters exogenously: the buyer/seller ratio in the goods
market, B, the seller’s surplus share in a match, θ, the elasticity of buyers’ search intensity, εe,
the share of buyers’ search intensity in the matching function in the goods market, ξ,a n dt h e
parameter in sellers’ intensity function, εk. Now we examine the sensitivity of the results to these
parameters. To do so, we change each of these parameters separately and calibrate the model
to the data again.19 The relative risk aversion is kept at the benchmark value, η = 4. Since the
results are similar when the model is calibrated to the short sample and to the long sample, we
report only the results for the long sample in Table 6.
Table 6 here.
The variability of velocity is insensitive to changes in the buyer/seller ratio, B. To explain this
insensitivity, note that an increase in the number of buyers creates two types of externality. One
19Ideally, we would like to pin down the value of θ by matching the mark-up ratio in our model to that in the
data. Unfortunately, the markup in our model varies too little with respect to θ:W h e n θ varies from 0.01 to
0.99, the markup almost remains constant at 0.44. This value of the markup lies in the range, (0.4,0.7), which
Domowitz et al. (1988) estimated from the US data but it is much smaller than the value (1.5) which Hornstein
(1993) estimated.
29is to increase the congestion for buyers. This negative externality reduces the number of matches
per buyer and reduces velocity. The other externality created by an increase in the number of
buyers is to increase each seller’s matching rate, which induces sellers to increase production and
inventory. This positive externality increases the number of matches per buyer and increases
velocity. Similar to Hosios (1990), the two externalities cancel out with each other when the two
sides of the market are rewarded according to their contributions to the match formation. The
latter condition is θ =1− ξ,w h i c hi ss a t i s ﬁed in the benchmark model. As a result, an increase
in the number of buyers does not change much the number of matches per buyer or velocity.
The variability of velocity responds positively to an increase in each of the three parameters,
θ, εe,a n dξ, but this response is not very large. This insensitivity is surprising because one
would expect that a change in any of these parameters would aﬀect agents’ search decisions, and
hence velocity, signiﬁcantly. An important reason for the insensitivity is that a change in these
parameters is accompanied by changes in other parameters that are necessary for satisfying the
identifying restrictions in Section 4. These accompanying changes oﬀs e tal a r g ep a r to ft h ee ﬀects
on velocity caused by the change in the parameter in the discussion. For example, when buyers’
search intensity, εe, increases, it becomes responsive to a shock to productivity or money growth.
However, to satisfy the identifying restriction on the ratio of shopping time to working time, the
parameter in the matching function, g0, must fall and the tightness of the goods market for buyers
must rise. These changes restrain the eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei nεe on velocity.20
Now consider the sensitivity of the results with respect to εk, a parameter in the function s(k)
that translates a ﬁrm’s inventory into its search intensity. Since the function s did not appear
in previous search models, we experiment a wide range of values of εk,f r o m0 .5t o1 6 . A sεk
increases from 0.5 to 16, most of the simulated moments, such as the negative correlation between
velocity and consumption growth, remain relatively stable. However, the variability of velocity
increases signiﬁcantly with εk. This is puzzling because when εk increases, the function s(k)i s
20Another reason for the insensitivity is that some of these parameters, such as θ and ξ, are shares to agents
o no n es i d eo ft h eg o o d sm a r k e t . Ac h a n g ei ns u c hs h a r e sa ﬀects the behavior of the two sides of the market in
opposite directions. Because velocity depends on both buyers’ search intensity and sellers’ inventory, the opposite
eﬀects largely oﬀset each other.
30less elastic with respect to inventory, which should make the number of trades and velocity less
(rather than more) volatile. Again, the explanation lies in the calibration process. Each time
when εk changes, the model is calibrated again to satisfy the identifying restrictions in Section
4 and, in particular, to satisfy Restriction (iii) on income velocity of money. An increase in εk
requires a large decrease in the steady state value of the function s(k), i.e., s∗. In this case, any
given amount of response in s represents a large change relative to the steady state level, and
hence a large variation in velocity. This eﬀect dominates the direct eﬀect of εk on velocity, and
hence generates the positive response of the variability of velocity to εk.
Notice that the variance ratio of output to sales decreases when εk increases. However, this
ratio is much higher than in the data. Even when εk is given a seemingly large value, 16, the
variance ratio is 3.56. In contrast, Blinder and Maccini (1991) found that the variance ratio
does not exceed 1.3 in the US data. In this sense, the benchmark model provided a conservative
estimate for the variability of velocity in the model. By increasing εk to reduce the variance ratio
of output to sales toward a realistic level, the model can generate higher variability of velocity.
6.2. Nash Bargaining
In the analysis so far, we assume that a buyer in a match (in the goods market) makes a take-it-
or-leave-it oﬀer but the oﬀer is constrained to give the seller a surplus no less than θ b ∆.S i n c eb ∆
is exogenous to the agents in a match, this bargaining protocol has an element of commitment.
In this section, we explore the Nash bargaining scheme which eliminates this element. Following
the convention, we assume that the threat point of each trader in bargaining is the future value
of the assets/goods that the trader has brought into the trade. Thus, if the quantities (q,x)a r e
traded in a match, the buyer’s surplus is [U0(c)−ωmx] and the seller’s is [b ωmx − (1 − δk)b ωkq]. Let
θ now denote the seller’s weight in Nash bargaining. The quantities (q,x) are now the solution
to the following problem:
max
(q,x)
[b ωmx − (1 − δk)b ωkq]
θ [U0(c) − ωmx]1−θ,s . t . x ≤ m/b.
31The main analytical diﬀerence between this formulation and the earlier one is that the quan-
tities (q,x) are determined after the households’ other decisions, rather than at the same time
as other decisions. As a result, these quantities (q,x) are functions of the household’s other de-
cisions. To see this, let λ now denote the Lagrangian multiplier of the constraint in the above
problem. In a symmetric equilibrium, λ > 0i fU0 > (1 − δk)ωk, as in the previous formulation.










(1 − δk)b ωk
¸
. (6.1)
Denote this function as q = q(m,c). Substituting q(m,c) into (2.10), we can solve for c = C(m,e).
Then, q = Q(m,e) ≡ q(m,C(m,e)).
In this environment, a household choosing consumption must take into account the eﬀect of
consumption on the quantity of trade. Since consumption depends on buyers’ search intensity,
then a household must also consider how the choice of search intensity aﬀects the trading quan-
tities. These eﬀects are summarized by the functions q(m,c)a n dQ(m,e). To incorporate these
changes, we modify the optimization problem (PH)i nS e c t i o n2 . 3b yr e p l a c i n gq with Q(m,e),
c with C(m,e)a n dx with m/b. The constraints (2.11) through (2.13) still apply.











where qc is the derivative of the function q(m,c) with respect to c. The only diﬀerence between
this condition and its counterpart in the previous formulation, (2.15), is the presence of the eﬀect
qc. Similarly, the dynamic equations for ωk and ωm in (3.6) need be modiﬁed. In particular, ωm








U0 +( 1− Gbe)ωm
¸¾
. (6.3)
We calibrate this alternative model using the same identifying restrictions as in Section 4.
For a monetary steady state to exist in this alternative formulation, the relative risk aversion
must be small. To see this problem, suppose that a household expects that consumption will
32increase. The marginal utility of consumption will decrease, which will strengthen the buyers’
bargaining position in a match (i.e., qc > 0). In turn, if the household’s buyers all bring in more
goods, then consumption will indeed rise. This reinforcing structure will reduce the marginal
utility of consumption suﬃciently when the relative risk aversion is high. However, for money to
serve as a medium of exchange, the marginal utility of consumption cannot be too low; otherwise
the households would hoard money. Thus, for an interesting steady state to exist, the relative
risk aversion must be low in order to limit the strength of the reinforcing structure between
consumption and q. When other parameters are set to realistic values, the relative risk aversion
must be much lower than one.21 For a higher value η = 4 to be consistent with a monetary steady
state, the fraction of consumption obtained through non-monetary trades must exceed 0.85. In
Table 7 we report the results for two combinations of (η,d).
Table 7 here.
With η =0 .1a n dd =0 .25, this model produces lower volatility of velocity than in the
benchmark model, despite that it generates much higher volatility of output. In contrast to the
benchmark model and to the data, velocity is now positively correlated with consumption growth
and negatively with nominal interest rate. Also, the positive correlation between inﬂation and
the nominal interest rate is almost unity, which is much larger than in the data. These results
are not surprising. Even in the previous formulation, these counterfactual results can occur with
very low relative risk aversion (see the case η =0 .2i nT a b l e3 .2).
T h ec a s ew i t hη =4a n dd =0 .87 does better to match the data. In this case, velocity is
much more volatile and output is less volatile than in the benchmark model. Notice that the
correlation between inﬂation and the nominal interest rate is negative, rather than positive as
in the benchmark model and in the data. This is because monetary transactions generate only
a small fraction of consumption in this model, in which case inﬂa t i o ni sd r i v e np r i m a r i l yb y
(negative) productivity shocks rather than monetary shocks.
21The same problem seems to arise in Lagos and Wright (2002). In all their calibration exercises, the relative
risk aversion is lower than 0.5.
337. Conclusion
We construct a dynamic search model to examine the behavior of velocity. The prominent
feature of the model is the presence of costly search in the goods market and the labor market.
Incorporating shocks to money growth and productivity, we calibrate the model to the US time
series data. Our model captures most of the volatility of velocity in the data. The moments
of other endogenous variables are realistic and in particular, the correlation between velocity
and consumption growth is negative in the model as in the data. We also ﬁnd that the model
generates persistent propagation of the shocks. Overall, productivity shocks exert a dominant
force on velocity and its co-movement with other variables.
The high volatility of velocity and persistent propagation of shocks can both be attributed to
costly search. Costly search in the goods market is important because in its presence, velocity
is equal to the trading frequency per buyer. This extensive margin of trade depends on buyers’
search intensity and sellers’ inventory. In the event of shocks, search intensity changes signiﬁcantly
as buyers try to smooth consumption. This creates part of the variability of velocity and initial
propagation to the shocks. Costly search in the labor market creates the additional variability of
velocity and further propagation. It does so by delaying the response of employment to shocks and
attenuating the immediate response of output. As a result, inventory is an important component
of the supply of goods. Since shocks aﬀect future inventory by changing current consumption
and sales, they generate persistent eﬀects on future search intensity, velocity and output.
It should be noted that money is the only asset in the model. Thus, asset substitutions driven
by interest rate changes are not the factor that makes velocity volatile here. Instead, all variations
in velocity are caused by the variations in the extensive margin of trade. Despite this deliberate
restriction, the model’s performance is encouraging. It indicates that search model of money
should be taken seriously in quantitative analyses, as well as in theoretical analyses.
Besides the behavior of velocity, our model provides some interesting results on the propa-
gation of the shocks. Given the way in which we identiﬁed the shocks, these results should be
viewed as preliminary ones that stimulate further investigation. Two of these results are partic-
34ularly noteworthy. One is that money growth shocks can aﬀect velocity and output persistently.
This result raises the hope that shocks to monetary policy may also have persistent eﬀects on real
activities. However, since not all changes in money growth are caused by monetary policy shocks,
one needs to identify monetary policy shocks before examining the policy eﬀects. Another result
is that a positive technology shock causes a persistent decline in employment. Given the recent
controversy on the response of employment to technology shocks in traditional models of business
cycles (see Gali, 1999, and Christiano et al., 2003), it may be useful to investigate further whether
a search model can provide a diﬀerent perspective on the issue. Again, to investigate this issue
thoroughly, we need to identify the shocks more carefully.
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38A. Data Sources
Data used in our paper mainly came from the following sources (all seasonally adjusted).
1. Citibase (Acronyms in bracket)
• M1 Aggregate (FM1), monthly. The quarterly data is calculated from the average of
three months.
• M2 Aggregate (FM2), monthly. The quarterly data is calculated from the average of
three months.
• Real M2 Aggregate (FM2DQ), monthly. The quarterly data is calculated from the
average of three months.
• Nominal interest rates (FYGM3), 3-month Treasury bill yield, monthly. The quarterly
data is calculated from the average of three months.
• Population (GPOP), quarterly.
• Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deﬂator (GDPD), index, 92=100.
• Consumer Price Index, Urban Area, All Items, 82 — 84 = 100, monthly. The quarterly
data is calculated from the average of three months.
2. Database, the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
• Civilian Employment (16 years and older), monthly.
• Civilian participation rate, monthly.
• Unemployment rate, monthly.
3. National Income and Products Accounts (NIPA), University of Virginia
• Real gross domestic product, in 1992 dollar, quarterly.
• Nominal gross domestic product, quarterly.
• Personal expenditure on non-durable goods, nominal, quarterly.
• Personal expenditure on service, nominal, quarterly.
• Government consumption, nominal, quarterly.
• Real inventory of farm industry, in 1992 dollar, quarterly.
• Real inventory of non-durable goods, non-farm industry, in 1992 dollar, quarterly.
• Real ﬁnal sales of domestic business, in 1992 dollar, quarterly.
39B. Identiﬁcation of Parameters
We ﬁr s tl i s tt h es t e a d ys t a t ee q u a t i o n so ft h em o d el. Mark steady state values with an asterisk.
Setting the shocks to zero and requiring all real variables to be stationary, we obtain the following
equations from (2.6) — (2.8) and (3.2) — (3.6):
c∗ = bGb(e∗,k∗)e∗q∗/(1 − d); (B.1)
∆∗ =[ U0(c∗) − (1 − δk)ω∗
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=( 1− θ)∆∗. (B.11)
Next, we solve the parameters using the restrictions (i) — (v) in Section 4, together with the
values of (β,γ∗,η,ψ,δw,θ,ξ,εe,B). This is done for the longer period 1959:II —1998:III, but a
similar exercise can be conducted for the shorter period 1959:II — 1988:I. Start with Restriction
(i). Since the size of the labor force is np(1+l∗)+u and the level of unemployment is u, Restriction
(i) implies u =0 .0611×0.6148 and np(1+l∗)=0 .6148×(1−0.0611). Since the ratio of inventory
to output is k∗/f∗ and the ratio of inventory investment to output is δkk∗/f∗, Restriction (ii)
solves δk =0 .0065/0.9 and leaves an equation k∗/f∗ =0 .9 to be utilized later. Computing the







Bq∗ =1 .6882. (B.12)
To use this equation, we divide (B.9) by (B.8) and substitute (G∗
b,G ∗
s) by (2.3). Then,
z∗s0(k∗)q∗





40Substituting z∗ = be∗/(nps(k∗)) and using (B.12), we have ζ ×0.9×1.6882 = k∗s0(k∗)/s∗. Under
the functional form of s,w eh a v ek∗(1−εk) =( 1− εk)s∗ +1 ,a n ds ok∗s0(k∗)/s∗ =1− εk +1 /s∗.
Thus,
s∗ =( ζ × 0.9 × 1.6882 − 1+εk)
−1 . (B.14)
As ζ is known by now, this yields s∗, which implies k∗ =[ ( 1− εk)s∗ +1 ] 1/(1−εk).
Also, using (B.5), we can solve for G∗
ss∗q∗ as
G∗
ss∗q∗ =( 1− d)
·












Since q∗, f∗ and s∗ are known now, this equation solves for G∗
s. Substituting this solution for G∗
s
in (B.9), we can solve for λ∗/ω∗
m.
Restriction (iv) helps identify α, np and l∗. To see this, calculate the wage/output ratio and

































































m has been solved already, this equation identiﬁes α.T h e nw ec a ns o l v ef o rl∗ using
f∗ = A∗(l∗)α. With the earlier restriction, np(1 + l∗)=0 .6148(1 − 0.0611), we can identify np.
Restriction (v) helps identify g0, z∗ and e∗.I ti m p l i e s
e∗ =0 .1117 × 0.3 × np(1 + l∗)/b =0 .03351 × (1 + l∗)/B,







Then, we can calculate ω∗
k from (B.6) and ω∗
m from (B.3). Since λ∗/ω∗
m is now known, we can
retrieve λ∗.A l s ow ec a np i nd o w nϕ, H0 and ω∗
l from (B.15)-(B.17) and ϕ0 from (B.11). Table
2 summarizes the identiﬁed parameters and steady-state values of variables.
41Table 1. Estimated VARs of money growth and log productivity




constant γt−1 lnAt−1 R2 σ ρ(γ,lnA) SC(1) SC(2) SC(3) 1 vs. 2 2 vs. 3
sample γt 0.840 -0.011 -0.174 0.051 0.00858 -0.177 -1061.4 -1052.8 -1047.7 5.674 12.698
1959:II (0.000) (0.892) (0.005) (0.225) (0.013)
—1998:III lnAt -0.361 0.165 0.818 0.650 0.01120 —
(0.000) (0.010) (0.000)
sample γt 0.810 -0.007 -0.188 0.075 0.00920 -0.224 -744.60 -737.44 -731.51 7.3634 9.834
1959:II (0.000) (0.940) (0.004) (0.118) (0.043)
—1988:I lnAt -0.441 0.239 0.827 0.660 0.01344 —
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000)
∗ SC(j) is the value of the Schwarz (1978) criterion that Hodrick et al. (1991, Table 2)u s e d .
The appropriate lag length is the one that generates the minimum of SC(j).
\ The likelihood ratio tests lag length j vs. length j +1 . Numbers in brackets are p-values.Table 2: Parameter Values, Shocks, and the Steady State
Parameter Values
A∗ 1 I 0.269 d 0.25 ψ 0.6
δw 0.06 η 4 ξ 0.8 θ 0.2
εe 2 εk 13 B 0.5
β 0.9952 γ∗ 1.01448 g0 6.34 u 0.0380
(0.9958)\ (1.01727) (6.03) (0.0376)
np 0.2496 b 0.1248 δk 0.0072 ϕ 231.03
(0.2417) (0.1209) (0.0072) (248.86)
ϕ0 0.5418 H0 2151.4 α 0.6704
(0.5952) (2287.8) (0.6705)
Steady State
c∗ 0.2227 q∗ 1.4125 e∗ 0.1585 v∗ 0.0541
(0.2182) (1.4758) (0.1601) (0.0550)
k∗ 1.1085 l∗ 1.3645 ω∗
m 70.500 λ∗ 1.4420





\The numbers in parentheses are for the period 1959:II — 1988:I.
The ones without parentheses are for the period 1959:II — 1998:III.
43Table 3.1: Simulated Moments vs. Sample Values for 1959:II - 1988:I
simulated moments data
η 0.2 2 4 6 8
E(Vc) 1.2237 1.2236 1.2239 1.2238 1.2235 1.2122
(0.0035) (0.0025) (0.0049) (0.0067) (0.0072)
σ(Vc) 0.0134 0.0138 0.0218 0.0270 0.0304 0.0239
(0.0015) (0.0011) (0.0024) (0.0033) (0.0039)
cv(Vc) 1.0924 1.1295 1.7786 2.2062 2.4853 1.9719
(0.1210) (0.0904) (0.1916) (0.2679) (0.3212)
cv(y) 1.461 1.195 1.129 1.096 1.096 1.890
corr(Vc,g c) 0.1949 -0.1148 -0.1855 -0.2070 -0.2162 -0.3537
(0.0682) (0.0690) (0.0504) (0.0457) (0.0434)
corr(Vc,i +1) -0.1913 0.2263 0.3354 0.3593 0.3802 0.5161
(0.0878) (0.0925) (0.0814) (0.0745) (0.0750)
corr(π,i) 0.9850 0.5492 0.2538 0.1134 0.0244 0.5135
(0.0027) (0.0615) (0.0830) (0.0913) (0.0921)
corr(π,r) -0.3271 -0.6684 -0.7760 -0.8185 -0.8412 -0.4940
(0.0788) (0.0488) (0.0347) (0.0282) (0.0257)
Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations over 1000 simulations.
Table 3.2: Simulated Moments vs. Sample Values for 1959:II - 1998:III
simulated moments data
η 0.2 2 4 6 8
E(Vc) 1.2640 1.2638 1.2638 1.2638 1.2639 1.2702
(0.0028) (0.0020) (0.0040) (0.0052) (0.0061)
σ(Vc) 0.0128 0.0131 0.0200 0.0259 0.0296 0.0224
(0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0020) (0.0027) (0.0033)
cv(Vc) 1.0112 1.0367 1.5836 2.0528 2.3379 1.7632
(0.0882) (0.0713) (0.1578) (0.2160) (0.2599)
cv(y) 1.237 1.009 0.943 0.912 0.912 1.619
corr(Vc,g c) 0.1773 -0.1166 -0.1885 -0.2169 -0.2267 -0.2834
(0.0622) (0.0590) (0.0466) (0.0375) (0.0382)
corr(Vc,i +1) -0.1485 0.1880 0.2801 0.3062 0.3211 0.5046
(0.0762) (0.0815) (0.0738) (0.0695) (0.0650)
corr(π,i) 0.9876 0.5959 0.3401 0.1658 0.0817 0.5074
(0.0020) (0.0499) (0.0668) (0.0768) (0.0808)
corr(π,r) -0.2849 -0.6545 -0.7567 -0.8267 -0.8504 -0.4354
(0.0698) (0.0431) (0.0333) (0.0237) (0.0208)
Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations over 1000 simulations.
44Table 4: Cross correlations of search intensity and inventory
with productivity and money growth for 1959:II — 1998:III











x−4 -0.6007 0.0269 0.7780 0.7256 -0.0590 -0.1111
x−3 -0.7155 0.0496 0.8702 0.7639 -0.0937 -0.1761
x−2 -0.8143 0.0798 0.9091 0.7278 -0.1378 -0.2189
x−1 -0.8747 0.1231 0.8537 0.6090 -0.1918 -0.2328
x -0.8296 0.4913 0.6545 0.4122 -0.1841 -0.1791
x+1 -0.5987 0.1730 0.4941 0.1318 -0.1429 -0.0698
x+2 -0.4530 0.1279 0.3689 -0.0698 -0.1099 -0.0301
x+3 -0.3388 0.0988 0.2715 -0.2170 -0.0838 -0.0397
x+4 -0.2503 0.0759 0.1959 -0.3230 -0.0627 -0.0358
e: buyer’s search intensity; k:i n v e n t o r y ;A: productivity; γ: money growth.
45Table 5: Simulation with Restricted Model Speciﬁcations
1959:II — 1998:III
simulated moments
without the productivity shock
data
η 0.2 2 4 6 8
cv(Vc) 0.7500 0.8071 0.8553 0.8909 0.9206 1.7632
cv(y) 0.228 0.195 0.195 0.163 0.163 1.619
corr(Vc,g c) -0.1550 -0.1508 -0.1687 -0.1859 -0.1901 -0.2834
corr(Vc,i +1) -0.0403 0.0382 0.0807 0.0969 0.1151 0.5046
corr(π,i) 0.9996 0.9763 0.9592 0.9293 0.9142 0.5074
corr(π,r) -0.2879 -0.2807 -0.3236 -0.3577 -0.3751 -0.4354
simulated moments
without the money growth shock
cv(Vc) 0.6645 0.6585 1.4071 1.8622 2.1478 1.7632
cv(y) 1.205 0.977 0.912 0.879 0.879 1.619
corr(Vc,g c) 0.3659 -0.1439 -0.2112 -0.2240 -0.2306 -0.2834
corr(Vc,i +1) -0.8778 0.8209 0.7093 0.6598 0.6331 0.5046
corr(π,i) 0.8470 -0.5440 -0.7451 -0.7992 -0.8240 0.5074
corr(π,r) -0.6873 -0.9662 -0.9826 -0.9869 -0.9889 -0.4354
simulated moments
without labor market search
cv(Vc) 1.5898 0.9589 1.1989 1.3040 1.3674 1.7632
cv(y) 2.260 0.852 0.623 0.524 0.492 1.619
corr(Vc,g c) 0.2788 -0.1043 -0.1630 -0.1780 -0.1819 -0.2834
corr(Vc,i +1) -0.1689 0.1569 0.2212 0.2363 0.2413 0.5046
corr(π,i) 0.9537 0.7003 0.6404 0.6156 0.6025 0.5074
corr(π,r) -0.4239 -0.5705 -0.5925 -0.6010 -0.6030 -0.4354
Standard deviations of the statistics are roughly the same as those in Table 3.2.
The simulation generates E(V c) ≈ 1.264 in all three cases and for all values of η.
46Table 6: Sensitivity to B, θ,εe, ξ and εk
for 1959:II — 1998:III
B 0.35 0.40 0.50∗ 0.60 0.65 data
cv(Vc) 1.5755 1.5748 1.5836 1.5796 1.5825 1.7632
(0.1558) (0.1522) (0.1578) (0.1535) (0.1586)
θ 0.1 0.2∗ 0.3 0.4 0.5
cv(Vc) 1.5198 1.5836 1.6243 1.6244 1.6405 1.7632
(0.1452) (0.1578) (0.1652) (0.1617) (0.1612)
εe 1 1.5 2∗ 2.5 3
cv(Vc) 1.4772 1.5464 1.5836 1.5886 1.6078 1.7632
(0.1432) (0.1477) (0.1578) (0.1505) (0.1546)
ξ 0.6 0.7 0.8∗ 0.85 0.9
cv(Vc) 1.2652 1.4323 1.5836 1.6472 1.7139 1.7632
(0.1024) (0.1278) (0.1578) (0.1682) (0.1800)
εk 0.5 2 6 13∗ 16
cv(Vc) 1.0730 1.1614 1.3582 1.5836 1.6449 1.7632
cv(y) 0.996 0.966 0.939 0.943 0.944 1.619
corr(Vc,g c) -0.1251 -0.1403 -0.1676 -0.1885 -0.1982 -0.2834
corr(Vc,i +1) 0.2479 0.2544 0.2673 0.2801 0.2820 0.5046
corr(π,i) 0.5693 0.5218 0.4329 0.3401 0.3153 0.5074
corr(π,r) -0.5063 -0.5674 -0.6709 -0.7567 -0.7799 -0.4354
var(output)
var(sales) 6.494 5.807 4.663 3.822 3.558
∗Marked parameter values are the ones used in the benchmark.
Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations over simulations.
All simulations produce E(V c) ≈ 1.264.
47Table 7: Simulation Results under Nash Bargaining











E(Vc) 1.2642 1.2645 1.2638 1.2702
cv(Vc) 1.1127 2.5725 1.5836 1.7632
cv(y) 2.710 0.770 0.943 1.619
corr(Vc,g c) 0.1988 -0.3511 -0.1885 -0.2834
corr(Vc,i +1) -0.1632 0.2622 0.2801 0.5046
corr(π,i) 0.9960 -0.0102 0.3401 0.5074
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raw
HP filtered
Figure 1 Velocity of M1 monetary aggregate
The ﬁltering uses the Hodrick-Prescott (1980) ﬁlter.
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Figure 2 Velocity of M2 monetary aggregate
The ﬁltering uses the Hodrick-Prescott (1980) ﬁlter.


































































































































Figure 3 Impulse responses to a positive productivity shock
Notes: The economy is in the steady state at time 0 and the shock occurs at time 1.
































































































































Figure 4 Impulse responses to a positive money growth shock
Notes: The economy is in the steady state at time 0 and the shock occurs at time 1.
Percentage deviations from the steady state are depicted.
52Supplementary Appendix
C. The Solution Method
The solution method is similar to Blanchard and Khan (1980). Below we describe the method.
Notice that some of the symbols used here do not represent the same meanings as the ones in the
text.
The dynamic system has exogenous state variables Yz ≡ (γ,A)T, two endogenous variables
Ys ≡ (k,l)T, and three jump variables Yd ≡ (ωk,v t,ωm)T. All other variables can be expressed as
deterministic functions of these variables, as discussed in Section 3. The exogenous state variables
are characterized by (4.1) and (4.1), while the dynamics of the other ﬁve endogenous variables
are described by (3.6). Stack Yd, Ys and Yz and denote the resulted 7×1 vector by Y . Then the
dynamic system can be written in the following form:
F(Yt,Y t+1)=0 .











where the ith element of yt is yit ≡ (Yit − Y ∗
i )/Y ∗
i , the percentage deviation of the variable Yit
from its steady state (i =1 ,2,...,7). Deﬁne the vectors ys, yd and yz similarly. By deﬁnition, the
steady state value of y is y∗ =0 .
















 + Qyzt + Ryzt+1, (C.1)
where W is a 5 × 5m a t r i x ;Q and R are 5 × 2 matrices. For exogenous {yzt}, this system has
two predetermined variables and three jump variables. For the system to be saddle-path stable,
the matrix W must have two stable eigenvalues (i.e., those whose absolute values are less than
one) and three unstable eigenvalues (i.e., those whose absolute values are greater than one). The
calibrated parameter values indeed generate such eigenvalues.
Let J1 be a 2 × 2 diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are the two stable eigenvalues,
and J2 be a 3× 3 diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are the three stable eigenvalues (the
eigenvalues are ordered in increasing absolute values along the diagonals of J1 and J2). Denote
J = diag(J1,J 2). Write W as W = C−1JC,w h e r eC−1 is the eigenvector matrix corresponding
to J. Decompose the matrices C, C−1, Q and R as follows:
C =

















































    

.
53For given ys0, the saddle-path solution to (C.1) is:
yst = B11J1B−1







2 [(C21Q1 + C22Q2)Et−1yzt+j−1 +( C21R1 + C22R2)Et−1yzt+j],
(C.2)
ydt = −C−1






2 [(C21Q1 + C22Q2)Etyzt+j +( C21R1 + C22R2)Etyzt+j+1].
(C.3)
The exogenous processes (4.1) and (4.1) can be written as yzt+1 = Γyt + εt,w h e r eεt is a vector
of iid random variables. Then Et(yzt+j)=Γjyzt for all j ≥ 0. Given a draw of innovations and
initial values ys0, one can calculate the time path of yst and ydt according to (C.2) and (C.3).
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